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THE AMOUNT WHICH MAY BE GIVEN BY A
DONOR MORTIS CAUSA.
AT LAW. The law of the Twelve Tables. allowed a
testator to dispose of all his effects to the exclusion of the
heir; but the love of offspring which may be relied on in the
case of descendants known to be such, must have become of
questionable applicability in the decadence of Roman virtue.
At a time when respectable matrons found it advantageous to
be entered on the municipal lists of prostitutes, it was neces-
sary that the law should throw some protection around the
heir. The lex Falcidia was a plebiscitum passed 714 A. U. C.
It required that there should be left to the heir at least one-
fourth of the property of the testator. Justinian altered the
proportions to a half or a third, according to the number of
heirs. The emperor Severus extended the lex Falcidia to
donations morris causa. In English and American polity, the
shameful necessity of such a law has not been experienced.
With us, no limit has been fixed at law beyond which dona-
tions m-ortis causa are forbidden.
As is said in Kent,' a " branch of parental duty consists in
Vol. 2, 202.
THE AMOUNT WHICH MAY BE GIVEN
making competent provision according to the condition and
circumstances of the father, for the future welfare and settle-
ment of the child; but this duty is not susceptible of municipal
regulations, and it is usually left to the dictates of reason and
natural affection. Our laws have not interfered on this point,
and have left every man to dispose of his property as he
pleases, and to point out in his discretion the path his children
ought to pursue. . . A father may at his death devise all
his estate to strangers, and leave his children upon the parish;
and the public can have no remedy by way of indemnity
against the executor. 'I am surprised,' said Lord Alvanley,
I that this should be the law of any country, but I am afraid
that it is the law of England.'
No limit as to pecuniary amount or proportion has been
placed on gifts mortis causa. In Duffield v. Riwes, I Bli.
N. S. 497, the value of the property given was £30,000; and
that was seventy years ago, when money was more valuable.
In Thomas's Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. I, decided lately in
Virginia, the property was worth $200,000. It was there
said that a -gift morris causa is none the less valid, if properly
proved, because it embraces the entire personal estate of the
donor. See, also, Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray (Mass.), 418;
Ifarshall v. Berry, 13 Allen (Mass.), 41.
One Pennsylvania case, Hteadley v. Kirby,1 has been thought
to hold that a donor cannot by donation mnoreis causa dispose
of his whole estate. A recourse to the report of the case
compels a different opinion of the decision, in the mind of the
writer, at least. Of the decision, we may well adopt the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Waite respecting a certain ruling
quoted before the United States Supreme Court: "The lan-
guage of the court in the opinion is to be construed with
reference to the question actually under consideration, and
should not be extended beyond for any purpose of authority
in another and different case." 2
The value of Headley v. Kirby consists in the recognition it
gives to the testamentary intent of a donor who uses language
18 Pa. 326.
Wright v Nagle, ioi U. S. 796.
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and acts comprehensive enough to affect the whole or a large
portion" of his entire personal estate.
One witness in this case said that the words of the decedent
were: "Ann, I am dying; all that is here with you is yours;
do the best for me when I am gone; there are the keys."
The property consisted of a variety of clothing, watch and
chain, pencil-case, spodns trunks-, aprumissary note for ;Fr6oo,
and a savings deposit book. They were contained some in
two trunks, others in a band-box, others in a closet in the
room where the decedent was.
Manifestly, there could be no delivery of such property,
situated in various parts of the room, in trunks, a band-box
and in a closet. The law requires specific delivery to validate
such gifts. It is very clear, then, that the decision of the
court in denying the validity of the attempted disposition was
correct. The court first alluded to the careful guards which
the Roman law threw around gifts, of testamentary nature,
requiring the proof to be by five witnesses of full age, of good
character, and not related either to the donor or donee. The
absence of such guards in our own law requires that we should
bestrict in preventing such dispositions as are really testamentary
from having effect except according to the Statute of Wills.
The court, per Lowrie, J., then went on to say: "It is not
pretended that any gift like this has ever been held good, and
it may be safely declared, that no mere gift made in prospect
of death, and professing to pass all one's property to another,
to take effect after death, can be valid under our Statute of
Wills, no matter what delivery may have accompanied it. If
this is not true, then it is plain that the Statute of Wills, so
far as it is intended to exclude all modes of disposing of per-
sonal property at death which it does not provide for, is
repealed by the decisions of the courts."
It is clear from this recital of the case that the decision does
not relate to a gift of an article or valuable or of a number of
such, specifically delivered, and where the words of gift are in
the present tense.
That case was decided in t852. In 1854, Michener
v..Dale,' was decided by the same tribunal, Judge Lowrie
'23 Pa. 59.
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being still a member of the court. In delivering the opifiion
in the latter case, Judge Woodward said: " It was greatly
insisted on in argument, that the court ought to have instructed
the jury that if the gold was theprincipal part of Mr. Dale's
property, he could not make a donatio mortis causa of it, and
for this Headley v. Kirby was relied on. In that case, there
was a variety of chattels-they were not specified by the
donor-nothing more than a constructive delivery occurred,
the language was evidently testamentary, and it referred
expressly to all the property." " In these particulars, the case
is broadly distinguishable from the present, and it does not
decide that where a single chattel is the whole of a man's
property, or the 'principal part of the property,' it may not be
given mortis causa. The doctrine of that case, predicated of
the circumstances then before the court, is not to be
questioned, for it rests on sound reason ; but, if applied to a
case like this, it would defeat all gifts made as memorials of
gratitude and affection in the most solemn circumstances of
life."
Headley v. Kirby, in the sense in which it is here explained,
was approved in M7farshall v. Beriy, in Massachusetts. Wells, J.,
said: "This mode of transmission can apply only to specific
articles capable of passing by delivery, and not as a disposition
of the donor's estate. Such a general disposition would be
void." I
I r3 Allen (Mass.), 46. Headley v. Kirby, is understood by Judge
Woerner, in the sense in which it is interpreted in this article. He said
of the decision, that it was rendered, "not because a man may not so
dispose of all his property, but because there is no specific reference to
the property, and because the language is testamentary, and the delivery
only constructive :" i Woerner on Administration, 63.
The language in the opinion in the recent case of Debinson v. Emmons,
33 N. E. 7o6. appears to corroborate strongly this view of Headley v.
Kirby. Barker, J., said : "The defendant contends that the gift was
invalid because it attempted to dispose of the donor's whole estate,
citing Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen, 43. But, fairly construed, the evidence
shows a gift only of specific articles, two trunks and their contents. This
question does not appear to have been raised at the hearing below
Although some expressions of the donor may be taken as declarations.
that all her property was in the trunks, they may also mean that all that
was in the trunks belonged to her," i. e., to donee.
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In Ofeaclk v. Heack,' Redfield, C. J.,. delivering the opinion
of the court, thus referred to Headley v. Kirby (rfiisunder-
standing it): "It may be somewhat questionable how far a:
dotatlio inortis causa is to be altogether invalidated, by reason
of its embracing the major part, or the whole of one's property,
if it be in other respects unobjectionable. Neither the-English"
or American cases have attempted any -.%uhrriteiioii %elbe
and it would seem, at first blush, rather difficult of application.
But if these cases- [alluding, also, to Moore v. Darton, 7 Eng-
L. & E. 134, wherein Vice Chancellor Bruce displayed
hesitation in holding that the English Wills Act had not
abolished donations mortis causa] show no more, they may be
regarded as evidencing a disposition on the part of courts in
both countries, not to extend these informal testamentary
dispositions of property in manifest abuse and disregard of
the salutary enactment in regard to wills." In that case, a
doutado mortis causa of personal property, consisting of stock
on a farm and choses in action to a considerable amount,
was upheld?
In Seabright v. Seabright,3 it was laid down that if such a
gift is of a very large amount and nearly the whole of the
donor's personal estate, whether the gift be inter ,ivos or
mnortis cansa, the court would require the most clear and
satisfactory proof of the gift; though it would require less
evidence to show, if the gift was established, that it was a gift
nortis causa and not a gift inter vivos. The court in this case
said further that despite Headie' v. Kirby' (misapprehending it),
the fact that a gift constitutes the principal or ..hole of the
donor's personal property, cannot be held to prevent abso-
lutely any effect to the gift. Such limitation of the extent of
a gift, whether mortis causa or inter rivos, can be brought
about at this late day only by legislation.
EQUITABLE AID. As the common law' allows total
disinhersion, relying only on the parents' love and wisdom, no
reason can be perceived howanylimit can be set as to the amount
124 Vt. 591.
2 See, also, the note by Judge Redfield, at p. 6oo.
3 28 W. Va. 415.
4 2 Rent, 327.
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of such donation, unless, perhaps, in those imperfectly executed
donations where there is no legal transfer of the title; as where
an unendorsed promissory note payable to order is delivered
to donee.
A passive permission on the part of the law is different from
an active aid afforded a parent in his endeavor to disinherit,
and when such attempt is made, to the extent, if successful,
of leaving the next of kin without means, why should equity
go beyond the law and 1luit a title where the common law has
refused it, even to injury of little children? The chancellor's aid
is matter of grace. Sarcastic this would sound in such case.
Reference may here be made to Lewin on Trusts, 8 I, 82, where
it is said that imperfectly created trusts, on meritorious con-
sideration, will not be executed either against the settlor himself,
or against his representatives, where they, too, could claim
meritorious consideration, as if they were the settlor's children
without adequate provision, or, probably, even where there is
adequate provision.
This view seems to have been taken by the Master of the
Rolls in Lawson v. Lawson.' In a case of donation mortis
causa, he observed: " 6200 out of ;,8ooo, being deemed
reasonable, decree allowing it is made."
It may be urged that equitable assignments are now recog-
nized, frequently, at law; but this is only because the law, in
its development, is taking up equitable principles. Shall we
not say, let the development be confined to those principles
which are equitable ?
LEGISLATION. In view of the danger of fraud attendant more
or less upon the recognition of the donatio inorris cautsa, some
legislation may be thought prudent. The New Hampshire
Statute is as follows: " No gift in expectation of death, often
called donatio morris causa, shall be valid, unless the actual
delivery of the property to the donee shall be proved by two
indifferent witnesses, upon petition of the donee to the judge
of probate to establish such gift, filed within sixty days after
the decease of the donor" : New Hampshire Public Statutes,
1891, § 18. Luther E. Hewitt.
Fi P. Wins. 440 (1718).
